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Abstract
Purpose In February 2009, the European Union’s (EU)
Directive for the inclusion of aviation into the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for CO2-emissions
came into force. From 2012 onwards, the EU-ETS will
cover virtually all flights departing or arriving in the EU.
As aircraft operators (i.e. airlines) will be required to hold
emission allowances for all flights that are subject to the
EU-ETS, the economical impacts of the system are
currently being discussed. This paper aims at estimating
and analysing the economical impact of the EU-ETS on the
aviation sector in total, on selected groups of airlines and on
the administering states.
Materials and methods This paper describes a simulation
model for the economical impact of the EU-ETS. Accord-
ing to current plans, the initial allocation of emission
allowances to airlines will be based on a benchmark which
is calculated by dividing the 2004–2006 CO2-emissions by
the transport performance of the year 2010. The simulation
model calculates CO2 emissions and transport performance
of European aviation for the timeframe 2004–2012. The
approach is based on flight schedules for passenger and
cargo air traffic coupled to an aircraft performance module.
By use of this model, the benchmark and hence the initial
allocation of emission allowances to airlines can be
estimated. Using assumptions on the development of the
CO2 allowance price, the economical impacts of the EU-
ETS can be discussed.
Results and discussion The economic effects of the
upcoming EU-ETS on the aviation sector in total, on
selected groups of airlines and on the administering states
are analysed and discussed. It is shown that additional to
the freely allocated allowances, nearly all aircraft operators
need to purchase allowances for about one third of their
emissions in 2012. The total cost for the aviation sector is
expected to be in the range between 1.9 and 3.0 billion € in
2012. Certain airline groups and administering EU States
will be affected very differently by the new EU legislation.
It is shown that particularly European network carriers will
be affected by a competitive disadvantage compared to
non-EU airlines.
Keywords Environment, aircraft emissions . Airline
competition . Air transport policy . Climate change .
Environmental economics . EU emissions trading scheme .
European Commission
1 Introduction
In July 2008, the European Council and the European
Parliament agreed to include international aviation into the
existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme for the limitation of
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CO2-emissions. The Directive came into force in February
2009 [8]. Aircraft operators will be obliged to surrender
allowances for virtually all commercial flights into, within or
out of the EU from 2012 onwards. The EU-ETS will affect
both European and third-country airlines. The European
Commission justifies this approach by stating that a distortion
of competition in the international airline sector needs to be
avoided to the most possible extent and that this approach
will improve the environmental effectiveness of the scheme.
Several non-EU states, however, have expressed doubts
regarding the environmental effectiveness of the EU-ETS
and whether the EU approach conforms to international law.
A number of economic studies on these controversial
issues have been conducted lately, e. g. by Faber, van der
Vreede and Lee [13], Forsyth, Dwyer and Spurr [15], Boon
et al. [5], Forsyth [14] as well as Scheelhaase, Grimme and
Schaefer [25]. These studies focus on different aspects of the
topic such as the method of initial allocation of allowances,
the impacts on tourism as well as the economic impacts on
different airline types. A meta-study by Anger and Köhler
[4] reviews the impact assessments of the EU-ETS as
developed in 9 different studies published between 2005
and 2009. It is found that some of the assumptions and
results differ considerably, such as assumptions with regard
to the cost pass-through rates used in the estimations. Other
assumptions, in contrast, are similar in all of the reviewed
studies, such as the assumed span for future allowance
prices. Two major points of critic Anger and Köhler are
bringing forward are an over-simplification of the calcu-
lations applied in the reviewed studies, and that some of the
studies are based on assumptions different to the eventual
content of the directive which came into force in 2009.
This paper analyses how the inclusion of aviation into the
EU-ETS will affect the air transport sector both economically
and ecologically. In order to target these questions, an
empirical simulation model was developed, which goes far
more into detail than those applied in previous studies. The
model is based on global flight schedules of the Official
Airline Guide (OAG) supplemented by a DLR developed
flight plan for cargo and integrator airlines. All flight move-
ments are simulated by DLR aircraft performance software in
order to calculate the specific fuel consumption and CO2-
emissions. By employing this model, current and future
CO2-emissions and transport performance data of European
aviation will be estimated. Furthermore, the economic effects
of the upcoming EU-ETS on both the aviation sector and
individual airlines will be estimated and discussed. In
contrast to earlier studies, our model’s assumptions are in
line with the contents of the final directive.
This paper is organized as follows: Initially, an overview
of the EU legislation on emissions trading and aviation for
the years 2012 and beyond is provided (chapter 2).
Subsequently, our modelling approach (chapters 3 and 4)
and the main economic and ecologic effects for the aviation
sector as well as for the EU member States are presented
and discussed (chapter 5). Finally, conclusions about the
impacts on costs, airfares and competition within the
aviation sector are drawn (chapter 6).
2 Political background
The EU Directive contains the following provisions for the
inclusion of aviation into the existing EU-ETS:
– Virtually all flights departing from or arriving at EU
airports will be covered from 2012 onwards. Domestic
flights will be subject to the same rules as international
air traffic. If any non-EU country introduced alternative
measures with similar climate protecting effects, the
geographical scope of the ETS could be modified such
that flights arriving from or departing for this particular
country are excluded from the scheme.
– Aircraft operators will be obliged to hold and surrender
allowances for CO2-emissions. Allowances are re-
quired for flights by fixed-wing aircraft with a
maximum take-off mass of 5,700 kg or above. Flights
performed under visual flight rules and rescue flights
(amongst a number of other exceptions) are excluded
from the scheme.
– Exemptions will also be granted for flights performed
in the framework of public service obligations (PSO)
on routes within outermost regions or on PSO routes
where the capacity offered does not exceed 30,000
seats per year. Also excluded from the EU-ETS will be
flights performed by a commercial air transport
operator operating either fewer than 243 flights per
four-month period for three consecutive four-month
periods (so-called ‘de minimis’ clause) or flights with
total CO2-emissions lower than 10,000 tonnes per year.
The ‘de minimis’ clause was added in order to reduce
administrative costs for operators with a low number of
flights to and from Europe.
– Regulations for emission monitoring and reporting will
take effect in 2010 while an emission cap for all aircraft
operators will be introduced in 2012.
– In the first year of the inclusion of aviation into the EU-
ETS, the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to
aircraft operators shall be equivalent to 97% of the
historical aviation emissions (so-called overall “cap”).
The historical aviation emissions will be calculated on
the basis of the average total emissions of the years
2004–2006 borne by all aircraft operators taking part in
the scheme. The historical emissions will be defined by
the European Commission with technical assistance
from Eurocontrol.
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– Initially, allowances will be allocated to aircraft
operators mostly free of charge. In the year 2012,
85% of the allowances shall be allocated for free. The
method of allocating allowances to aircraft operators
will be harmonised within the European Union.
– The total number of allowances allocated to each
aircraft operator will be determined by a benchmark
which is calculated in three consecutive steps: First, the
share of auctioned allowances is subtracted from the
overall “cap”. Second, the remaining CO2-emissions
will be divided by the sum of verified tonne-kilometre
data for flights falling under the geographical scope of
the EU-ETS in the monitoring year 2010, as reported
by all participating aircraft operators. Third, the
specific amount of allowances each operator receives
is calculated by multiplying the respective individual
tonne-kilometre value of the monitoring year with the
benchmark. Each operator’s revenue tonne-kilometres
are calculated by multiplying the mission distance
(great-circle-distance plus an additional fixed surcharge
of 95 km) by the payload transported (cargo, mail and
passengers). For the calculation of the performed
tonne-kilometres, each passenger including baggage is
assigned a value of 100 kg.
– In 2012, allowances allocated to aircraft operators will
be valid within the aviation sector only. However,
additional permits can be purchased from other sectors
or from the project based Kyoto instruments “Joint
Implementation” and “Clean Development Mecha-
nism”. Allowances not used in 2012 can be ‘banked’
to the third trading period of the EU-ETS (2013–2020).
– Allowances not allocated free of charge (15%) will be
auctioned by the Member States. The revenues should
be used to tackle climate change in the EU and third
countries, inter alia, to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions, to adapt to the impacts of climate change or to
fund research and development in these fields.
The EU Directive for the period 2013–2020 [8], as it was
agreed in December 2008, aims at improving and extending
the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of
the Community. Due to its broader nature, it adopts
regulations for all sectors included in the system and very
few aviation-specific rules. It is understood that most of the
regulations for the first year of the inclusion of aviation into
the EU-ETS which are described above will be further
applied. However, the total quantity of emission allowances
to be allocated to aircraft operators shall then be equivalent
to only 95% of the historical aviation emissions, multiplied
by the number of years in the eight-year period. The use of
the project based Kyoto instruments “Joint Implementa-
tion” and “Clean Development Mechanism” will be
lowered significantly for aircraft operators. In the period
2013 until 2020, aircraft operators may use emission
permits from “Joint Implementation” and “Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism” only up to 1.5% of the amount of
allowances they are required to surrender per year (in 2012:
15%). However, purchasing emissions permits from sta-
tionary sources is possible without limitations.
3 Modelling air transport’s CO2-emissions
and transport performance
Modelling the upcoming EU-ETS requires an estimation of
both European aviation’s fuel consumption (and hence
CO2-emissions) and the corresponding transport perfor-
mance measured in tonne-kilometres. This is not an easy
task since no detailed and publicly available statistics
regarding CO2-emissions of the European air transport
sector exist to date. The approach chosen for our study
combines world-wide flight schedules with an aircraft
performance software. OAG flight schedules for the years
2004–2008 were supplemented by an additional flight plan
for all-cargo flights. Schedules from OAG were selected
since information on actual aircraft movements from filed
flight plans or radar data collected by Eurocontrol are not
publicly available. Flights from and to the European Union
(EU27 plus outermost regions) were identified by evaluat-
ing the origin and destination country codes. Although
some charter services operated on behalf of tour operators
and ad-hoc charters are not included in OAG, we regard
OAG data as a good proxy for the air transport volume in
the passenger sector considering the following aspects:
& According to DLR calculations based on EUROSTAT
figures for 2007, non-scheduled flights account for
about 12% of all IFR passenger flights [11]. With OAG
data containing all scheduled and some of the unsched-
uled air traffic, the percentage of non-OAG passenger
flights should be smaller than this figure.
& A large percentage of these non-scheduled flights can
supposed to be operations exempted from the EU-ETS,
e.g. flights with aircraft of less than 5,700 kg maximum
take-off mass or flights falling under the ‘de minimis’
clause.
& As some flights are typically cancelled, OAG will
slightly overestimate the real traffic volume from
scheduled services. This overestimation, in turn, may
compensate for the unscheduled passenger flights not
included in OAG.
For the air cargo market, in contrast, OAG data
availability is less satisfying, as most integrator services
and all ad-hoc services are missing. In order to improve
the data availability in the cargo sector, we have compiled
a flight plan comprising a presumably large part of the
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non-OAG all-cargo flights from and to Europe. This
additional schedule mainly consists of double-checked
flight information found in airport timetables, in press
releases of air cargo companies and on websites run by
aviation enthusiasts.
The aircraft performance software VarMission developed
at the DLR Institute of Propulsion Technology was
employed to calculate fuel consumption and CO2-emissions
of each flight in the flight schedules. VarMission is written
in Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). A
Microsoft Access database contains aircraft and engine
data. For this study, the tool uses aircraft models from the
EUROCONTROL Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) [10].
This database contains information on 91 aircraft types
including most large airliners. Aircraft for which no data
are available can be represented by models with similar
characteristics. In order to speed up the calculation process,
interpolation tables produced by VarMission for all aircraft
models were used in this study, which contain pre-
calculated flight mission protocols for different ranges and
payloads as well as the fuel burn along these profiles. Using
these look-up tables in combination with interpolation
methods, fuel burn and emissions can be calculated for
each flight in the flight schedules. Fuel burn and emissions
calculations based on BADA data have a history of being
used for global emission inventories (e. g. the FAA’s SAGE
inventories) and can be considered a standard for such
applications [12].
The VarMission software considers taxiing on the
ground, take-off, climb, cruise and descent flight phases.
The fuel consumption of a flight is calculated iteratively,
reducing the aircraft mass (due to fuel burn) in each
calculation step. Since the take-off mass of a flight is
initially unknown, the program performs the calculation
process “backwards”, i.e. starting with the aircraft’s empty
weight plus payload, considering reserve fuel quantities and
analysing all flight phases in reverse order. The flight
distance of each flight was estimated by applying an
empirical “inefficiency” factor to the great-circle distance
between origin and destination airports. The factor ranges
from 1.06 on short-range flights (up to 500 km) to around
1.03 on long-range missions.
The payload assumed for each flight could be calculated
based on the aircraft’s maximum payload multiplied by a
flight’s weight load factor. While flight schedules contain
information on payload capacity available on each flight,
actual passenger numbers and the (total) payload trans-
ported had to be estimated. For this purpose, each flight in
the schedules was supplemented by load factor data from
different sources. The sources used to determine both seat
load factors and overall weight load factors include the
ICAO Traffic by Flight Stage databank and ICAO’s Air
Carrier statistics [19]. By combining such data with the
available seats and payload capacities from the schedules,
an estimation of the relevant transport performance for the
years 2004–2008 could be provided.
As the EU-ETS will be introduced in 2012, forecast
flight schedules were produced based on the latest
available scheduled data. Given the current economic
situation, no traffic growth was assumed between 2008
and 2010. For the years 2010–2012, on the other hand,
regional growth factors derived from common manufac-
turers’ forecasts were applied to the base year flight
schedules in order to produce a forecast up to the year
2012. The introduction of more fuel-efficient aircraft,
potential improvements in the field of Air Traffic Man-
agement and a further increase in terms of load factors
were considered by assuming a 1% efficiency improve-
ment per year resulting in a corresponding reduction of
fuel-consumption and emissions per tonne-kilometre. This
way, a reliable and best possible estimation of traffic
volumes and CO2-emissions of European flight operations
up to the year 2012 could be performed.
Forecasts of traffic volumes and CO2-emissions were
created for this study covering the years 2010 to 2012. In
our forecast of traffic volumes we are assuming that recent
market developments like heavily fluctuating oil prices, as
well as the costs for participating in the EU-ETS, will have
no sustainable negative impact on future aviation growth in
the medium and long-term. This is because a number of
studies indicate that airlines will be able to pass on, to a
large extent, the additional costs to the customers, of whom
many are not very price sensitive (see e.g. [6], [26]).
However, we are taking into account the 2008/2009
worldwide recession. We assume a recovery point in the
second half of 2009, leading to 2010 traffic volumes equal
to those of 2008 before the recession (i.e. until August).
From September 2010 onwards the forecast is based on our
data for the last 12 months before the recession in
combination with average annual growth rates derived from
the most common manufacturers’ forecasts, i.e. the Airbus
Global Market Forecast [1], Boeing’s Current Market
Outlook [3] and Rolls-Royce’s Market Outlook [24].
Additionally, the forecast of the ICAO Forecast and
Economic Subgroup (FESG) was analysed [18]. Each of
these forecasts provides average annual growth rates for the
transport performance on either region or country pair level
up to 20 years into the future. For our model, an average
forecast was created, using the mean growth rate of all four
market forecasts for each region or country pair. The
projected growth for air traffic from and to Europe in terms
of passenger-kilometres lies between 3.4% per annum
(domestic flights within Western Europe) and 6.0% per
annum (flights between South East Asia and Western
Europe). In the cargo market, forecasted growth rates are
typically higher and vary between 4.15% (within Europe)
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and 7.45% (China-Europe). A sensitivity analysis showed
that the use of just one of the original forecasts mentioned
above would not have resulted in significantly different
results on a global scale.
For the development of the CO2-Emissions, however, a
factor of 1% per year for autonomous efficiency gains is
included in the forecast. This value is based on long-term
observations of the air transport system and correlates with
the fuel efficiency target of IATA for the years 2000 to
2010 [16]. The factor represents the efficiency gains that
will be achieved in the air transport system by e.g.
optimisation of operational procedures, air traffic control
or the introduction of larger, more modern and more fuel-
efficient aircraft.
4 Modelling the upcoming EU-emission trading system
4.1 Overview
Given the world-wide flight movements, the transport
performance in tonne-kilometres and CO2-emissions, core
elements of the upcoming EU-ETS can be modelled. Our
modelling approach is based on the Directive 2008/101/
EC [9]. The regional scope assumed for the emissions
trading scheme comprises all flights from and to the
European Union (plus outermost regions). While the
participation of EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
states seems likely, flights within and between Norway,
Switzerland, Iceland and non-EU-countries are not
included in our model.
The ‘deminimis’ clause (see chapter 2) was incorporated in
the model and operators with less than 10,000 t CO2 emitted
per year or fewer than 729 flights per year in 2010 were
identified. The results of the model show that none of the
airlines contained in the OAG flight schedules and operating
to/from the EU emits less than 10,000 t CO2 per year.
However, 95 operators were identified with less than 729
flights per year, representing about 1% of the total emissions
and 2% of the revenue tonne-kilometres according to the
reporting standards of the EU-ETS. For simplification,
further checks for public service obligation (PSO) routes or
routes within the outermost regions were omitted, as both the
emissions and RTKs of these flights are negligible with less
than 0.1% of the total RTKs performed on flights to or from
the EU. Actually, most PSO routes in the EU will require
emission allowances, as the exclusion criterion of 30,000
seats offered annually (which corresponds to only 82 seats
per day) is exceeded by most of them.
The most important elements of modelling the economic
effects of the upcoming EU-ETS for aviation are the initial
allocation of CO2-emission allowances and the future
development of CO2 allowance prices.
4.2 Initial allocation of CO2-emission allowances
The first step in modelling the initial allocation of the
upcoming EU-ETS is the calculation of the total amount of
emission allowances available to the aviation sector in the
first trading period in 2012. The total constitutes 97% of the
average 2004–2006 historical aviation emissions:
Total Allowances2012 ¼ 0:97 Historical Emissions20042006
ð1Þ
As 15% of the total allowances will be auctioned, the
number of allowances allocated to the operators free of
charge will be calculated as follows:
Free Allowances2012 ¼ 0:85  Total Allowances2012 ð2Þ
For the calculation of the benchmark, which will be used
for the free allocation of allowances to each individual
operator in 2012, the total allowances allocated free of
charge will be divided by the revenue tonne-kilometres
reported for the year 2010:
Benchmark2012¼ Free Allowances2012Reported RTK2010 ð3Þ
In compliance with the EU Directive [9], a passenger
weight of 100 kg and an addition of 95 km to the great-
circle distance of each flight need to be considered when
calculating the reported RTKs.
4.3 Development of the CO2-emission allowances price
until 2020
The prices of EU Allowances (EUAs), Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs) from Kyoto-based Clean Development
Mechanism projects and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)
from Kyoto-based Joint Implementation projects and the
future development of these prices are important factors for
the economic impact of the EU-ETS on the aviation sector.
Our assumptions on the carbon price in the years 2012 and
2020 are based on findings in the relevant literature ([6],
[20], [21], [22] and [26]) and on the following thoughts:
1. The carbon price is directly determined by the
abatement costs for an additional unit of CO2. This is
because emitters can either abate CO2 or buy CO2
permits to comply with their individual reduction target
in an ETS. In the course of time, CO2 abatement in the
EU will become more costly due to the tightening of
the EU-ETS overall cap. A number of researchers
believe that the ambitious target set by the European
Commission to reduce CO2-emissions by 2020 can
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only be realised by the deployment of CCS coal plants
(coal plants that are equipped with carbon capture and
storage technology) and renewable energy sources. In
the medium term it could become viable at prices of 35
€/t CO2 to 40 €/t CO2 [21]. For this reason, we assume
a maximum price of 40 € per tonne of CO2 in the
period 2008–2012.
2. The possibility of ‘banking’ unused allowances from
one trading period to another will ensure a relatively
common EUA price across both trading periods (2008–
2020).
3. The inclusion of the aviation sector as well as the
aluminium, petrochemical and ammonia industry into
the EU-ETS starting from the year 2012 will not raise
EUA prices significantly. This was shown by a number
of studies, for instance by [20] and [6]. But the
progressively rising level of auctioned allowances and
the ambitious overall greenhouse gas cap will lead to
rising prices for EUAs until 2020.
4. The prices for CERs and ERUs will mirror the EUA
price developments because the prices for these project-
based permits are in principle also determined by the
factors explained above. Due to a higher risk of non-
delivery related to CERs and ERUs (compared to
EUAs), CER/ERU prices are currently a bit lower than
EUA prices. We believe that this spread between the
prices for both kinds of permits, which at present
amounts to about 4 €, will persist in the future.
On this basis, we assume price ranges for EUAs and
CERs/ERUs for the years 2008–2012 and 2013–2020 as
shown in Table 1. Taking into account the rather high levels
of uncertainty of these future developments, we assume a
price spread for each trading period and permit type. In
order to diminish complexity, in this paper our estimations
only take into account the assumed prices for EUAs.
4.4 Limitations and assumptions in our model
As it is the case with every model, our model contains
several simplifications compared to reality. The following
paragraph discusses some of the implications of the
assumptions the model is based on.
In principle, several scenarios concerning the pass-
through of acquisition costs and opportunity costs of freely
allocated allowances can be considered. In case a partial or
full pass through occurs, it is reasonable to assume that a
demand reaction will follow, depending on the extent of the
price increase and the price elasticity of demand. In the
model presented herein, we assume no change in passenger
demand or airline supply in reaction to the EU-ETS. This is
due to the fact that reliable data on the price elasticity of
demand for air travel does not exist for this issue. This
implies the assumption that none of the costs for the EU-
ETS will be passed through to passengers and shippers of
air cargo. Furthermore, our forecasting model increases
frequencies on existing routes, but does not take into
account potential impacts of the EU-ETS on airline
strategies concerning aircraft size, frequencies or the
discontinuation of existing routes. As the results of our
model presented in this paper are focused on the assessment
of cost impacts for the airline industry in the rather short-
term until 2012, we are not predicting long-term changes in
market, fleet or network structures.
5 Results
5.1 World-wide transport performance
The modelled CO2-emissions and the transport perfor-
mance for flights to and from the European Union are not
directly comparable to any publicly available data. How-
ever, as our model covers not only flights to and from the
EU but the global air transport system, it is possible to
compare the results for the world-wide transport perfor-
mance with statistics published by ICAO. It should be
noted, however, that the integrator and all-cargo services
considered in our model do not cover all such flights within
and between countries outside the EU, which are likely to
be included in the ICAO statistics. Table 2 compares model
results and ICAO data for world-wide scheduled air traffic.
It can be observed that, on a global level, the goodness of
fit between modelled transport performance and ICAO data
is within a range of 5%. Generally, it seems that the model
overestimates available seat-kilometres (ASK) and revenue
passenger-kilometres (RPK) slightly compared to ICAO
statistics. The total tonne-kilometres (RTK) calculated are
very close to the reference, but given the incomplete
coverage of all-cargo flights in our model, this seems to be
consistent with the slightly overestimated ASKs and RPKs.
Looking at the reference data from another angle, it is also
questionable whether data published by ICAO can be
considered as 100% accurate. This is because ICAO is
dependent on data delivered by its contracting states as well
as on data availability. As a result, the quality of ICAO data
is likely to be rather heterogeneous.
Data availability for a validation on a more detailed
geographical level is problematic. While in the United
States a very accurate set of air transport data is provided
by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, airline-specific
information on flown aircraft kilometres or revenue ton
kilometres is not available for other world traffic regions.
Based on the data from the United States we conclude that
also on a more detailed geographical level, our estimations
show a very good fit compared to published data. On
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average, the accuracy for modelled passenger kilometres for
US airlines shows a slight overestimation of around +1%.
5.2 Transport performance and CO2-emissions for flights
to/from the EU & allowances available to aircraft operators
The model results regarding transport performance and
CO2-emissions of the worldwide air traffic as well as for
flights from and to EU airports are shown in Fig. 1. The
CO2-emissions of flights from and to EU airports and the
corresponding transport performance are summarized in
Table 3. The average yearly emissions from 2004 to 2006
amount to 183.3 million tonnes. Considering the ‘de
minimis’ clause and subtracting emissions of operators
with less than 729 flights per year, the historical CO2-
emissions subject to the EU-ETS are estimated at 180.9
million tonnes. It is worth noting that, through the EU-ETS,
roughly one third of global aviation’s CO2-emissions will
be subject to a regulation.
According to our model, the aviation sector will receive
175.5 million allowances for the emission of CO2 in the
year 2012, since the owner of one allowance has the right to
emit one tonne of CO2. 85% of all allowances, i.e. 149.2
million will be allocated free of charge while the remaining
15% (26.3 million allowances) will be auctioned. Consid-
ering the estimated range for the future price of allowances
(25 €–40 €), governments of the EU Member States will
receive between 660 million and 1050 million € as a
revenue from the auctioning of allowances.
It is worth noting that our model seems to underestimate
aviations’ emissions under the EU ETS in the year 2008 by
5% according to unofficial figures presented by the European
Commission in May 2010 [25]. This slight underestimation
may have numerous reasons but can only be analyzed when
the highly political EU ETS cap will be officially published.
Currently, its publication is postponed until 2011.
5.3 Benchmark calculation
For 2010, we estimate the transport performance of all
flights from and to EU airports at 229,196 million tonne-
kilometres flown (see Table 4). This translates into 254,400
million tonne-kilometres according to the reporting stand-
ards of the EU-ETS. The difference between these two
values is the fixed surcharge of 95 km to each flight’s great-
circle distance allowing for any route inefficiencies and the
uniform assumption of 100 kg per passenger for the
conversion of passenger kilometres into tonne-kilometres.
Carriers operating less than 729 flights per year in the EU
will not be obliged to participate in the EU-ETS. As a
consequence, their transport performance will have to be
excluded from the calculation of the benchmark. In the year
2010, this applies to 95 operators with 5,166 million reported
tonne-kilometres, representing approximately 2% of the total
tonne-kilometres of all flights from and to EU airports. The
benchmark, calculated by dividing the amount of freely
allocated allowances by the tonne-kilometres reported for the
year 2010 is estimated by our model at 0.60 kg CO2 per RTK.
Year Kilometres flown in million (modelled) Kilometres flown in million (ICAO) Delta
2004 30,103 29,163 3.2%
2005 32,362 30,862 4.9%
2006 33,541 32,137 4.4%
Year ASK in billion (modelled) ASK in billion (ICAO) Delta
2004 4866.1 4704.7 3.4%
2005 5209.1 4975.9 4.7%
2006 5444.1 5197.3 4.7%
Year RPK in billion (modelled) RPK in billion (ICAO) Delta
2004 3565.3 3445.3 3.5%
2005 3867.7 3721.7 3.9%
2006 4107.6 3940.6 4.2%
Year RTK in million (modelled)a RTK in million (ICAO) Delta
2004 459,598 458,910 0.1%
2005 500,464 487,860 2.6%
2006 516,998 514,750 0.4%
Table 2 Comparison of select-
ed model results with ICAO
data for world-wide scheduled
traffic
a assuming a passenger weight of
90 kg
DLR model results; ICAO data
from [17] and [2]
Permit type EUAs CERs/ERUs
Trading period 2008–2012 2013–2020 2008–2012 2013–2020
€ per tonne CO2 25–40 40–55 21–37 37–52
Table 1 Assumptions on the
EUA and CER/ERU price de-
velopment in the future
DLR estimation
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5.4 Freely allocated allowances vs. emissions in 2012
and acquisition costs for the aviation industry
An important parameter for estimating the costs of the EU-
ETS for the aviation sector is the difference between the
number of allowances allocated for free and the actually
needed allowances for the first trading period. By applying
our forecasting method, we estimate that the CO2-emissions
of flights to and from airports in the EU will amount to a
total of about 226.4 million tonnes in 2012. Considering the
‘de minimis’ clause and excluding operators with less than
729 flights per year, emissions of 223.6 million tonnes of
CO2 will be subject to the EU-ETS.
With 149.2 million allowances allocated for free (see
above), airlines will need to buy allowances for about 74.4
million tonnes of CO2-emissions. Taking into account the
estimated price span of 25 € to 40 € for allowances, the cost
for the acquisition of allowances will be between 1.9 and
3.0 billion € for the entire aviation sector subject to the EU-
ETS (in 2012). The results also show that CO2 allowances
for about 48.1 million tonnes will have to be purchased by
aircraft operators from other sectors, as only 175.5 million
new allowances will be available to the aviation sector on
the basis of Directive 2008/101/EC.
5.5 Comparison of acquisition costs for different
groups of airlines
As the forecast of individual airlines’ future emissions is
associated with rather large uncertainty, for the following
analysis we focus on groups of airlines, clustered by their
geographical origins and business models.
Table 5 shows forecasted CO2-emissions, the estimated
amount of allowances allocated for free and the potential
acquisition costs for three groups of airlines. The first group
(10 largest EU network carriers) contains the EU-based
network carriers with the largest transport performance
measured in RTK, i.e. Lufthansa, British Airways, Air
France, KLM, Iberia, Virgin Atlantic, Alitalia, SAS, TAP
and Finnair. The second group (10 largest non-EU network
carriers) consists of Singapore Airlines, American Airlines,
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Fig. 1 Historical and forecasted transport performance and CO2-
emissions (Transport performance assumes a passenger weight of
90 kg; The period of time not modelled is marked by “??”). Source:
DLR model results based on OAG data [23] supplemented by all-
cargo services from and to Europe
Table 3 Historical transport performance and CO2-emissions of
flights to/from the EU
Year RTK in million
(modelled)a





a assuming a passenger weight of 90 kg
DLR model results
Table 4 Forecasted transport performance and CO2-emissions of
flights to/from the EU
Year RTK in million
(modelled)a





a assuming a passenger weight of 90 kg
Source: DLR model results
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Continental, Thai, Korean Air and JAL. The third group
consists of the ten largest EU-based low cost and charter
carriers, which are Ryanair, easyJet, Air Berlin, Condor,
LTU, TUIfly, Corsair, Clickair and Vueling.
Our model confirms earlier findings by the authors [25]
that EU-based network carriers will be affected by a
competitive disadvantage compared to their non-EU-based
counterparts: Table 5 shows that the percentage of
allowances allocated for free compared to the allowances
required for the airlines’ operations remains at a signifi-
cantly lower level for EU-based network carriers than for
non-EU carriers. This can be explained by the fact that EU-
based carriers operate their feeder network under the ETS,
while non-EU-based carriers operate only long-haul flights
with comparably lower specific emissions under the ETS.
The percentage of freely allocated allowances for low cost
and charter carriers (LCC) is in between the corresponding
percentages for EU-based and non-EU-based network
carriers. While most low cost routes are relatively short,
such airlines operate at high seat densities, high passenger
load factors and with modern aircraft, therefore achieving a
relatively high percentage of free allocation. However, as we
assume the growth of the LCCs to be in line with overall
market growth rates, a higher growth of traffic and emissions
could effectively result in a lower percentage of free
allocation and, consequently, higher acquisition costs.
5.6 Revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances
per EU Member State
As mentioned earlier, 15% of the allowances created for the
aviation industry will be auctioned by the EU Member
States in the year 2012. In order to reduce the administra-
tive burden on aircraft operators and EU Member States,
Directive 2003/87/EC provides for one Member State to be
responsible for each aircraft operator. Article 18a of the
Directive contains the provisions governing the assignment
of each aircraft operator to its administering Member State.
The administering Member State in respect of an aircraft
operator shall be:
(a) in the case of an aircraft operator with a valid
operating license granted by a Member State, the
Member State which granted the operating license in
respect of that aircraft operator; and
(b) in all other cases, the Member State with the
greatest estimated attributed aviation emissions from
flights performed by that aircraft operator in the
base year.
In August 2009, the European Commission published
the official list of aircraft operators and their administering
Member StateS [7]. This list is based on data provided by
Eurocontrol using records of flight plans. According to
Article 3d of the Directive, the number of allowances to be
auctioned by each Member State shall be proportionate to
its share of the total attributed aviation emissions for all
Member States for the reference year reported (2010). This
provision determines the amount of revenues generated
from the auctioning of allowances per Member State.
Therefore it may have significant financial impacts.
Unfortunately, it allows for different interpretations. Upon
request, the German Designated National Authority for
administering the EU-ETS (DEHSt) clarified that the
allowances for auctioning shall be allocated to the admin-
istering Member State according to the respective share of
the 2010 emissions of the airlines administered. In contrast,
an allocation of allowances to the administering Member
State according to the attributable share of the 2010
emissions seems also to be in the scope of the provision
of Article 3d of the Directive. By employing our empirical
model described above, we have investigated the financial
impacts of both possible interpretations of this provision.
Table 6 shows our estimation of the revenues generated
from the auctioning of allowances in the year 2012 per EU
Member State for the two different interpretations of Article
3d under consideration. In addition, the delta in revenues
(in million €) is presented.
Only a few EU Member States will generate consider-
ably high amounts of revenues from the auctioning of
Table 5 Comparison of initial allocation, forecasted emissions and
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allowances: United Kingdom, Germany, France, The
Netherlands, Spain and Italy. These EU States will receive
between 224.5 million € (UK) and 29.4 million € (I) under
the assumption of an allowance price of 25 € per t of CO2,
and between 359.5 million € (UK) and 47 million € (I) with
an assumed allowance price of 40 € per t/CO2 in the year
2012. Consequently, United Kingdom, Germany, France,
The Netherlands, Spain and Italy will receive more than
two thirds of the total revenues from the auctioning of
allowances while the remaining 22 EU Member States will
gain less than one third combined. (Fig. 2)
This can firstly be explained by the fact that some of the
biggest airlines of the world operate under a license granted
by one of these Member States mentioned above, e. g.,
British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France/KLM, etc. Secondly,
due to the relatively high number of scheduled flights served
within as well as to and from these EU Member States,
especially to and from intercontinental destinations, the
amount of attributed emissions is remarkably bigger
compared to those of the remaining Member States.
As shown in the table above, both UK and Germany
will benefit to a large extent from the interpretation (of
Table 6 Auction revenues per EU member state
Proportional allocation, according to attributable
aviation emissions in 2010












































Austria 1.5% 10.1 16.2 1.2% 7.8 12.4 −2.4 −3.8
Belgium 2.5% 16.8 26.8 1.6% 10.6 17.0 −6.2 −9.9
Bulgaria 0.2% 1.2 1.9 0.3% 1.7 2.7 0.5 0.8
Cyprus 0.3% 2.3 3.6 0.2% 1.2 1.9 −1.1 −1.7
Czech
Republic
0.6% 3.9 6.2 0.4% 2.9 4.7 −0.9 −1.5
Denmark 1.6% 10.6 17.0 0.4% 2.9 4.6 −7.7 −12.4
Estonia 0.1% 0.4 0.6 0.1% 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0
Finland 1.2% 7.8 12.4 1.3% 8.4 13.5 0.7 1.1
France 14.6% 97.5 155.9 12.3% 82.3 131.6 −15.2 −24.3
Germany 18.7% 124.7 199.5 20.1% 134.2 214.8 9.6 15.3
Greece 1.3% 8.8 14.1 0.7% 4.6 7.4 −4.2 −6.7
Hungary 0.5% 3.1 5.0 0.6% 4.0 6.4 0.8 1.3
Ireland 1.3% 8.7 13.9 3.1% 20.9 33.4 12.2 19.5
Italy 7.6% 50.9 81.5 4.4% 29.4 47.0 −21.6 −34.5
Latvia 0.2% 1.1 1.7 0.2% 1.3 2.1 0.2 0.4
Lithuania 0.1% 0.6 1.0 0.1% 0.4 0.7 −0.2 −0.3
Luxemburg 0.8% 5.5 8.8 0.8% 5.1 8.1 −0.5 −0.7
Malta 0.1% 0.8 1.2 0.1% 0.9 1.4 0.1 0.2
Netherlands 8.1% 54.2 86.7 7.5% 50.1 80.2 −4.1 −6.5
Poland 0.9% 5.8 9.3 0.6% 4.0 6.3 −1.8 −2.9
Portugal 1.8% 11.7 18.7 1.6% 11.0 17.6 −0.7 −1.1
Romania 0.4% 2.4 3.9 0.3% 1.7 2.7 −0.7 −1.2
Slovakia 0.1% 0.5 0.9 0.2% 1.4 2.2 0.8 1.3
Slovenia 0.1% 0.4 0.6 0.1% 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0
Spain 9.1% 60.6 97.0 6.3% 42.1 67.3 −18.6 −29.7
Sweden 1.5% 10.0 16.0 1.9% 12.9 20.6 2.9 4.6
United
Kingdom
25.5% 166.5 266.4 33.7% 224.5 359.3 58.1 92.9
100.0% 666.9 1067.1 100.0% 666.9 1067.1
DLR model results
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Article 3d) that allowances will be auctioned according
to the emissions share of the administered airlines. This
could be justified by the fact that both countries
administer most large network carriers, particularly those
from non-EU countries, and will have to bear a relatively
high administrative burden. However, given that air
transport markets are widely liberalised and at least for
intra-European flights of Community carriers the nation-
ality does not matter any more, such an interpretation
seems to be problematic from an equity point of view.
Therefore a very thorough interpretation of Article 3d is
highly recommendable.
6 Conclusion
From 2012 onwards, the EU emissions trading system will be
applied to the aviation sector and cover virtually all flights
departing or arriving in the EU. The initial allocation of
emission allowances to airlines will be based on a benchmark
which is calculated by dividing historical CO2-emissions of
the airlines participating in the scheme by their transport
performance (expressed in revenue tonne-kilometres) of the
year 2010. In this paper, we have applied a DLR-developed
simulation model. This model is one of the first of its kind
capable of simulating the future development of the aviation
sector. In particular, it allows for the estimation of the
economic impact of the EU-ETS on both the aviation sector
in total and on selected groups of airlines. The five main
results of our analysis can be summarised as follows:
First, if the EU will be successful in integrating non-EU
carriers into the EU-ETS as planned today, a relatively
ambitious CO2 control will be possible: Our results show
that roughly one third of global aviation’s CO2-emissions
will be subject to the new regulation.
Second, the benchmark, which is the basis of the initial
allocation of allowances to aircraft operators, is estimated
by our model at 0.60 kg CO2 per RTK. Apart from very
few exceptions, virtually all passenger airlines will need to
purchase additional CO2 allowances for their operations in
2012 and beyond. On average, carriers operating from and
to EU airports will have to purchase allowances for about
one third of their emissions in 2012.
Third, based on the estimated range of future allowance
prices (25–40 € per ton of CO2), the total cost for the
aviation sector is expected to be in the range between 1.9 and
3.0 billion € in the year 2012 alone. As the potential for
endogenous emission reduction in the aviation sector is rather
low, the airlines will have to buy allowances for about 48.1
million tonnes of CO2 from stationary sources taking part in
the EU-ETS.
Fourth, a more detailed analysis of selected airline groups
reveals that resulting from the EU-ETS, European network
carriers will be affected by a competitive disadvantage
compared to non-EU airlines. For EU-based carriers, the
percentage of freely allocated allowances compared to the
total allowances required will remain below the corresponding
level for non-EU carriers. This is because the former operate
their feeder network with relatively high specific emissions
under the ETS, while the latter operate only long-haul flights
to and from Europe. This implies a systematic cost disadvan-
tage for European network operators.
Fifth, our estimations of the revenues generated from the
auctioning of allowances show that only a few EU Member
States will generate considerably high amounts: United
Kingdom, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Spain and
Source: DLR model results 
N
Fig. 2 Share of auction revenues for EU member states by allocation mechanism. Source: DLR model results
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Italy. Due to different possible interpretations of the rules
concerning the auctioning of allowances, some EU States
may profit more than others. Therefore, a very thorough
interpretation of these rules is highly recommendable.
Finally, it becomes evident that the integration of
aviation into emission trading schemes is a particularly
difficult challenge both from an environmental economics
and political standpoint. To jeopardize matters, emissions
trading systems designed fundamentally different will be
introduced globally within the next 5–10 years with some
of them being already in force (New Zealand, e. g.).
Linking the EU trading scheme with these systems will be
technically complex and may lead to competitive distor-
tions within the aviation sector. Therefore a global system
or an international harmonized approach for the limitation
of aviation’s CO2 emissions would be the best solution.
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